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The advent of e-book publishing revolutionized the literary publishing world, but also 
brought about significant changes in the distribution and pricing models, which may 
not be in conformity with competition law and are, thus, under scrutiny by 
competition authorities. Moreover, the existence of multiple e-book formats may 
hinder competition and could be seen as an abuse of dominant market position; this is 
due to the fact that they raise platform compatibility issues and, also, that they are tied 
to proprietary reader technology.
Introduction 
i 
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An electronic book, shortly e-book, is basically a digital file that contains text and 
icons, which is distributed over the Internet, but can be read offline on a computer and 
other electronic devices, mainly dedicated e-book readers. E-books are the electronic 
equivalent of print versions, but may also be originally produced in digital format, i.e., 
‘born digital’.ii Their advantage over traditional print books is that they become more 
accessible and easily traceable.iii They are also less costly, while modern technology 
provides the ability of a conceivable number of e-books and journals to be stored on a 
device.iv
Ε-books were introduced in the early 1990’s, but they did not make any success until 
new devices were developed that provided ease of use.
 
v Notably, the Amazon’s 
Kindle, Sony’s PRS-500 and Barnes & Noble Nook were the most successful devices, 
while a certain breakthrough came with the advent of Apple iPad and Apple’s 
iBookstore.vi As of 2010, the sale of e-books began to grow exponentially and on 
May 19, 2011 Amazon announced that it has sold more e-books than hardcover and 
paperback print books combined.vii This development is indicative of the effect that 
digitization has on the publishing industry, which undergoes a transformation similar 
to those already taken place with regard to the music and entertainment industry.viii E-
book publishing becomes a trend of future advance and the new landscape of digital 
publishing has the potential to change not only the way people assimilate information, 
but also the way of reading, whether for work or for pleasure.ix
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The transformation of the publishing sector is associated with the change of the 
distribution model. Under the traditional wholesale model for books, publishers set a 
recommended retail price, which is half the price of the print edition, and give the 
seller the freedom to control the final price, offering discounts at their discretion.
From the Wholesale Distribution Model to the Agency Distribution Model 
x
In more particular, in January 2010 Apple announced that it had agreements with five 
of the six largest publishing houses to provide e-book content for the iPad, who were 
based on an agency model that gives publishers the ability to set e-book prices, while 
Apple receives a commission of 30 percent from each e-book sale through Apple’s 
online bookstore. This implies that publishers have the ability to set e-book prices by 
their own, while Apple become a distribution agent for sales to consumers.
 A 
radically different approach is adopted, however, with regard to e-books. 
xi Under 
this agreement, e-book prices are tied to the list prices of comparable print editions 
and thus, e-book prices would vary in a range from $ 12.99 to $ 14.99 for most 
general fiction and nonfiction titles.xii Publishers of e-books are also required to 
ensure that the prices of e-book offered through the iBookstore are not higher than the 
prices at which they are offered from other e-book distributors  (so-called ‘most 
favored nation’ clause).xiii
Amazon, on the other hand, has set a low price for new releases of e-books ($9,99) in 
order to give a boost to their sales, but that model was opposed by publishers, which 
worried that these discounts could lead to cannibalization of hardcover sales and lead 
to expectations of consumers of low prices for all books. Publishers preferred the 
agency model suggested by Apple, as it gave them higher prices than those offered by 
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Amazon. Consequently, Amazon was forced to enter into negotiations with book 
publishers and also accept the agency model.xiv
 
 
The pricing models adopted for e-books are not without consequences for the 
competition on the market. This is elucidated by the fact that e-book publishers’ 
practices are under investigation on both sides of the Atlantic. In particular, in March 
2011 the European Commission carried out unannounced inspections at the premises 
of companies that are active in the e-book publishing sector in many EU Member 
States and on December 6, 2011, decided to open an investigation into Apple and five 
major book publishers (Hachette Livre, Harper Collins, Simon & Shuster, Penguin, 
and Holzbrink, the German parent of Macmillan).
Legal review of price fixing and the agency distribution model for e-books 
xv
The US Department of Justice has also initiated legal proceedings on April 13, 2012 
against Apple and certain e-book publishers, alleging that the companies have 
violated US antitrust laws by agreeing to fix the price of electronic books. Likewise, 
16 U.S. States have filed a lawsuit in a district court in Texas against Apple and 
certain publishing companies, alleging that they have acted anti-competitively by 
fixing e-book prices.
 The Commission had reason to 
believe that the companies concerned may have violated EU antitrust rules that 
prohibit cartels and other restrictive business practices, according to Art. 101 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
xvi
Under EU law, a prohibition of price fixing is established by virtue of Article 101 (1) 
of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, stating that “the following 
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shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in 
particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any 
other trading conditions; (...)”. 
The jurisprudence of the CJEU is clear that a provision setting out minimum retail 
prices to be charged by distributors has as its object the restriction of competition.
xviii
xvii 
So, e.g., in Pronuptia v. Schillgalis the CJEU provided guidelines on the compatibility 
of distribution franchises with Article 101 (1). It thereby held that ‘provision which 
impair the franchisee’s freedom to determine his own prices are restrictive of 
competition’. Also, in SA Binon & Cie v SA Agence et messageries de la presse the 
Court held that ‘provisions which fix the prices to be observed in contracts with third 
parties constitute, of themselves, a restriction of competition within the meaning of 
Article 101 (1) which refers to agreements which fix selling prices as an example of 
an agreement prohibited by the Treaty’.  
In accordance with this jurisprudence, agreements between suppliers and distributors 
that provide for fixing minimum prices to be charged by distributors would be 
regarded as restricting competition.xix However, it is accepted for a supplier to provide 
dealers with price-guidelines, so long as there is no concerted practice for the actual 
application of the prices.xx The CJEU also held in AEG-Telefunken v. Commission 
that the provision of price guidelines or the operation of a selective distribution 
system might be compatible with Article 101 (1) so long as it is not operated in a way 
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that precludes price discounting.xxi Moreover, the Commission has taken strong action 
against resale price management and imposed sanctions for fixing resale prices.xxii
It is notable that Regulation 330/2010 of April 2010 provides in Article 2 for an 
exemption of Article 101 (1) TFEU as regards vertical agreements, in so far as such 
agreements contain vertical restraints. This provision applies to vertical agreements 
relating to the assignment of intellectual property rights and thus, it is relevant in case 
of e-books. However, under Article 4 of the Regulation, the benefit of the block 
exemption in Article 2 does not apply “to vertical agreements which, directly or 
indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the 
parties, have as their object: (a) the restriction of the buyer's ability to determine its 
sale price, without prejudice to the possibility of the supplier to impose a maximum 
sale price or recommend a sale price, provided that they do not amount to a fixed or 
minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the 
parties (…)”. 
 
With the enactment of Regulation 330/2010 the European legislator acknowledges 
that certain types of vertical agreements can improve economic efficiency within a 
chain of production or distribution by facilitating better coordination between the 
participating undertakings. Nevertheless, resale price management is regarded as a 
«hardcore» restriction of competition that is objectively illegal and cannot benefit 
from the exemption.xxiii 
As a result, the imposition of specific ranges of e-book prices by Amazon and Apple 
can be seen clearly as an infringement of Article 101 (1) TFEU. It has been mentioned 
above that Apple included in the ‘agency distribution’ agreements a clause that ties 
the price of e-books to prices of comparable print editions, which results into prices 
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ranging from $ 12.99 to $14.99, while Amazon has set $9.99 as the default price for 
most new edition of e-books. The same can be said for the requirement set forth by 
Apple in the ‘agency distribution’ agreement “that publishers not permit other 
retailers to sell any e-books for less than what is listed in the iBookstore” (‘most 
favored nation clause’). Such agreements restrict competition between the parties on 
the supply side and limit the choice of purchasers and thus, fall under Article 101 (1) 
TFEU.xxiv
Furthermore, the ‘agency price model’ introduced by Apple could be regarded as a 
vertical restraint falling under the prohibition of this provision for the reason that it 
limits the freedom of retailers to determine the final price of e-books, since the prices 
are essentially fixed by publishing companies.  
 
It is left to see whether the e-book agency agreement falls within the prohibition by 
Article 101 (1) or not. In case the reseller is regarded as an agent, there is no 
agreement between undertakings and Article 101 (1) TFEU does not apply. For a 
reseller to be qualified as an agent, according to CJEU jurisprudence and the 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints of the EU Commission
xxvii
xxv, it is crucial to establish 
whether it operates as: i) an ‘auxiliary organ’ forming an integral part of the 
principal’s undertakingxxvi; or ii) an independent economic operator assuming 
financial and commercial risks linked to sale or the performance of contracts entered 
into with third parties so that the agreement is subject to Article 101 (1).  
In our view, the agency agreement between e-book publishers and resellers such as 
Apple seems to fall within the ambit of Article 101 (1) TFEU, as any other vertical 
agreement, since operators acting as agents do not form an integral part of the 
business of the former and they also do not assume apparently any financial and 
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commercial risks linked to the sale or the performance of contracts entered into by the 
latter with consumers. 
Moreover, the selling of books at a fixed price may be seen as contravening Article 28 
TFEU. In case Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft v. LIBRO 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH the CJEU established that the prohibition on importers of 
German-language books from fixing a price below the retail price fixed or 
recommended by the publisher in the State of publication constitutes a restriction on 
the free movement of goods which cannot be justified.xxviii 
It is notable that the price of e-books has been regulated explicitly in France, where 
Act No. 2011-590 of 26 May 2011 on the price of digital books (Loi n° 2011-590 du 
26 mai 2011 relative au prix du livre numérique) was established. The objective of 
this act is to allow e-book publishers to maintain control over the price of e-books in 
order to assure the promotion of the cultural and linguistic diversity.
In this case, the Austrian 
law provided that the publisher or importer is under an obligation to fix and publish a 
retail price and the importer is not to fix a price below that one. The Court established 
that ‘such provisions are to be regarded as a measure having equivalent effect to an 
import restriction contrary to Article 28 EC, in so far as they create, from imported 
books, a distinct regulation which has the effect of treating products from other 
Member States less favourably’. 
xxix It provides in 
Article 2 that any person established in France, which publishes a digital book for 
commercial distribution in France is required to set the price for sale to the public 
concerning any type of offer and this price has to be announced to the public. The 
selling price may differ depending on the content of the offer or the modality of 
access or use. Thus, it may not be in conformity with this Law to establish minimum 
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sale prices for e-books, however, there is no conflict with the agency agreement, 
introduced by Apple. So, there is still a need to implement competition rules in the 
agency distribution model.  
In the U.S., the early jurisprudence of the Supreme Court found that retail price 
management is a per se violation of section of the Sherman Act.xxx However, the 
Supreme Court later revised its position and stated that vertical price restraints such as 
minimum and maximum resale price management had to be judged by the rule of 
reason, i.e. after a complete analysis of the effects of such practice on the market.xxxi
Moreover, since the General Electric Decisionxxxii, the jurisprudence of lower courts 
in the U.S. found no liability under antitrust legislation in case of an agreement, in 
which an intellectual property owner only licenses its rights to another party or 
distributor and limits or specifies the price of a sublicense. This might be the case also 
for e
xxxiii
 
Thus, such practices could be regarded as permissible under federal antitrust law.  
-books, since the object of transactions between e-book publishers and online 
retailers is a license and not the sale of hard copies.  
Consequently, the agency distribution model and also the ‘most favored nation’ 
clauses included in the agency agreement would be both subject to a rule of reason 
analysis, and the outcome of the case seems uncertain. 
 
 
A particular issue of concern is that there exist different formats of e-books and some 
formats are compatible only with their branded format.  So, e.g., Kindle e-books can 
Antitrust Issues concerning tying of e-books to branded formats 
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be read on Kindle devices or on other platforms, depending on the agreements made 
by Amazon with other providers.xxxiv There is a certain tie of hardware to content of 
digital books and a lack of common standards, which both may compromise the rights 
of e-book consumers. This tie to reading devices, the raise of new intermediaries, and 
the increased value of comprehensive book collections are seen as a major problem 
for competition and openness of information markets.xxxv
Under EU law of competition, the practice of a competitor who may try to foreclose 
its competitors by tying may constitute an abuse of dominant position.xxxvi
xxxvii
 
  Generally, 
there is a case of “tying” that can constitute an abuse under Article 102 TFEU when 
pursued by an undertaking in a dominant position, where customers that purchase one 
product (the tying product) are required also to purchase another product from the 
dominant undertaking (the tied product). In the situation where certain e-book formats 
are compatible with e-book readers offered only by providers of certain e-book stores, 
it appears to be a case of technical tying. Notably, a case of technical tying occurs 
when the tying product is designed in such a way that it only works properly with the 
tied product (and not with the alternatives offered by competitors).  
A similar situation occurred in the case where Microsoft made available the Windows 
client PC operating system conditional on the simultaneous acquisition of the 
Windows Media Player (WMP) software. The Commission found that Microsoft had 
infringed Article 102 TFEU (former 82 EC), as it abused its market power by tying its 
WMP with its Windows operating system.xxxviii
xxxix
 Consequently, Microsoft filed an 
application for the annulment of the Commission’s decision, but the Court of First 
Instance of the EC rejected the claims relating to the annulment of the contested 
decision.  In its decision, the Court found that the tying of the two software 
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products led to the foreclosure of competing media players from the market and thus, 
it had anticompetitive effects that cannot be offset by the uniform presence of media 
functionality in Windows, as supported by Microsoft, which pointed out that software 
developers and Internet site creators avoided the need to include in their products 
mechanisms which make it possible to ascertain what media player is present on a 
particular client PC. Microsoft also claimed that the integration of WMP in Windows 
led to the de facto standardization of the WMP platform, which had beneficial effects 
on the market. This argument was rejected by the Court, which held that generally, 
standardization may effectively present certain advantages, but it cannot be allowed to 
be imposed unilaterally by an undertaking in a dominant position by means of tying 
and also, because third parties may not want such a de facto standardization. 
For the provision of Article 102 TEAFU to apply in e-books, it has to be established 
whether the undertaking is dominant in the tying product market, but not necessarily 
in the tied market.xl Additionally, the following conditions must be fulfilled: (i) the 
tying and tied products must be distinct products, (ii) the undertaking concerned does 
not give customers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product; and 
(iii) the practice in question forecloses competition.xli
 
 In particular, it has to be 
investigated whether an operator of a web store offering e-books enjoys a dominant 
position in the market for e-books and it offers books that can only be read by e-book 
reading devices manufactured by the same company. Such an investigation has not 
been initiated by national competition authorities or by the EU Commission, but it 
remains a possibility. 
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It has been shown in the previous analysis that in the market for digital works new 
exploitation and distribution models are introduced that might be more suitable for the 
proliferation of new digital assets such as e-books. However, the changes that take 
place are not always compatible with antitrust legislation and particularly, clauses in 
distribution agreements that limit the freedom of distributors and limit competition 
might be found to infringe anti-trust legislation. In addition, the tying of e-book 
format to specific hardware might also be regarded as infringing in case certain 
requirements are fulfilled. 
Conclusion 
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